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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NARVOL A. JOHNSON and LAF AUN J. 
FLEMING, as the Guardian of the Person 
and Estate of ARTHUR JOHNSON an 
incompetent, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
CALVIN C. JOHNSON and ANNA R. 
JOHNSON, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
8888 
The primary parties to this suit are the only children 
of Arthur Johnson, an incompetent. In a separate con-
tested proceeding, the District Court held on August 13, 
1957, that Arthur Johnson was an incompetent. A son, 
X arvol A. Johnson, and a daughter, LaFaun J. Fleming, 
were appointed his guardians. They brought this suit 
against their younger brother, Calvin C. Johnson, on 
October 5, 1957, to set aside two deeds from the incompe-
tent to Calvin to have a contract of sale and a will de-
clared to be void, and for an accounting. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
The case was tried to the court without a jury. The 
trial court found that since the Spring of 1955, Arthur 
Johnson has not been "mentally competent and has been 
physically incapacitated to handle and manage his busi-
ness and affairs, during a substantial portion of said 
time." The court also found that the defendant Calvin 
C. Johnson had procured the deeds of conveyance by 
fraud and undue influence. The court set aside both 
deeds and declared the Will and the contract of sale to 
be void. The court also ordered the defendants to render 
an itemized account to the court "of all the assets and 
property" of Arthur Johnson, the incompetent, from the 
1st day of January, 1955. From this judgment, the de-
fendants have appealed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellants assert as the trial court's only error 
of law its denial of appellants' request for a jury trial on 
the issues concerning the validity of the will. Appellants 
expressly admit on page 19 of their brief that they were 
not entitled to a jury trial on any other issue. All other 
assignments of error challenge the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain the trial court's findings. The facts 
will, therefore, have to be fully set forth in connection 
with our argument, and for that reason we will not dis-
cuss the facts in detail here. 
The recitation of the facts by the appellants is in-
complete, in that appellants fail to note the evidence sup-
porting the trial court's findings. The basic facts are 
reflected by the findings. The trial court found that since 
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the death of the wife of Arthur Johnson on July 16, 
1953, Arthur Johnson "has failed to maintain an active 
interest in his personal and business affairs, and has 
permitted the defendant Calvin C. Johnson, by default, 
rather than by express authorization or consent, to over-
see most of his business and affairs." (Finding No. 4) 
During all of the time since the death of his wife, Arthur 
Johnson has by reason of his relationship to Calvin, "re-
posed special trust and confidence" in Calvin, and Calvin 
has obtained and exercised a dominating influence over 
his father. (Finding No.7) 
For approximately three years preceding the trial, 
Arthur Johnson has suffered ill health and "infirmities 
of age, and has undergone a number of serious surgical 
operations in connection therewith, which have seriously 
incapacitated him from carrying on his business and 
pursuits," and Calvin has taken upon himself, particu-
larly since the 1st of January, 1955, "the responsibility 
and control over the assets and properties of the said 
Arthur Johnson, and has dealt with, managed and oper-
ated said property as he has seen fit." There is no evi-
dence that he has ever accounted to Arthur Johnson with 
respect thereto. (Finding No.8) The court further found 
that since "the early spring of 1955, Arthur Johnson 
has not been mentally competent and has been physically 
incapacitated to handle and manage his business and 
affairs during a substantial portion of said time; that on 
or about the 20th day of July, 1955, and again on May 
20, 1956, and at times when the said Arthur Johnson was 
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1n a weakened Inental and physical condition, and de-
prived of immediate contact with his other children and 
close relatives and friends, and as a part of a fraudulent 
and wrongful scheme and design to obtain from him and 
without adequate consideration therefor, real property of 
the said Arthur Johnson of a substantial value and com-
J_Jrising farm lands with improvements and water rights" 
and also valuable business properties. (Findings 9 and 
10) 
The court further found that Calvin Johnson 
promptly recorded the warranty deed to the business 
property, but failed to record the contract of sale; that 
''there is no evidence in the record of any consideration 
for said deed (to the business property) having passed" 
from Calvin to Arthur Johnson at the time the deed was 
recorded, or at any time since said date. (Findings 11 
and 12) 
The court also, in Finding No. 1-±, noted that Calvin 
had managed the business affairs of Arthur J olmson and 
had received substantial an1ounts of property and 
1noneys, for which he had never accounted. The evidence 
fully sustains these findings. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUSTAINS THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS. 
(a) IT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED UNDER PRINCIPLES 
OF RES JUDICATA THAT ARTHUR JOHNSON WAS 
AN INCOMPETENT. 
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The proceedings in the incompetency hearing were 
not introduced in evidence, but were referred to on cross-
examination of the various witnesses, who had testified 
at the earlier hearing. It is noted on pages 5 and 6 of 
appellants' brief that a petition was filed by respondents 
on July 27, 1957, to have the court declare Arthur John-
son, their father, to be an incompetent. It is also there 
noted that a hearing was held on August 6, 1957, and that 
the court granted the petition and declared Arthur 
Johnson to be an incompetent. This order is dated Aug-
ust 13, 1957. Although this was a contested proceeding 
opposed by Calvin, no appeal was taken from that order. 
In has thus become final under principles of res judicata, 
and at least hy August 13, 1957, Arthur Johnson was 
incompetent. 
(b) SINCE THE SPRING OF 1955', ARTHUR JOHNSON 
HAS BEEN MENTALLY INCOMPETENT AND 
PHYSICALLY INCAPA·CITATED A SUBSTANTIAL 
PORTION OF THE TIME. 
Arthur Johnson was deeply affected by the death of 
his wife; it took the pep out of him, and he seemed to 
lose interest in the active management of his affairs. 
(R. 120, 35) At the same time, he was suffering from 
severe hypertension and arteriosclerosis and prostate 
trouble. (R. 52-3) He had moderate to very severe hyper-
tension as early as 1952, and he did not respond well to 
treatment. (R. 53) On October 8, 1953, he underwent a 
serious prostate operation in San Diego, California, and 
then underwent a similar operation within a matter of 
weeks thereafter. He was in great pain. (R. 38, 59, 167) 
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In the latter part of December, 1953, he was again hos-
pitalized for complications arising out of the same 
trouble, and was released from the hospital in January of 
1954. (R. 59) Dr. Fulstow saw him in May of 1954, and 
checked Mr. Johnson's blood pressure. A_t this time it 
was 228 over 144 over 140. A pressure of 135 over 85 
was normal. (R. 60) In September, 1955, he complained 
of "ringing in the head," which would indicate an in-
crease r,f blood pressure. (R. 60) Taylor Crosby, admin-
istrator of Kane County Hospital, testified that Mr. 
Johnson was hospitalized from April 19th to 23, 1955. 
(R.lOO) 
In the Spring of 1955 he underwent his first eye 
operation in Salt Lake City, and in the early summer of 
that year was again hospitalized for the same trouble. 
In the Fall of 1955 he underwent a second eye operation 
in Salt Lake City, and was under rather constant treat-
ment during the entire Spring, Summer and Fall of that 
year. (R. 167) He was hospitalized again in December of 
1955. During this time, and on December 27, 1955, the 
hospital records contain a note that: ··Patient up de-
rnanding coffee (at 2:30 a.m.) up wandering, extremely 
obnoxious in action." (R. 92) 
The illness continued on into the Spring of 19G6. 
I mrnediatel~· prior to the tirne (~Jay 20, 1956) when Cal-
vin procured the contract of sale and the deed to the \alu-
able business property in l{anab, Arthur J olmson had 
undergone an intensive period of serious physical disa-
bility. lie was suffering frorn acute l1igh blood pressure 
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on April 30, 1956. Dr. Fulstow testified that his blood 
pressure had increased to 286 over 162 over 158. (R. 55) 
The doctor said this was an extremely high blood pres-
sure and that: "Recorded blood pressures at that 
amount suggests that a stroke is dangerous, the possi-
bility of a stroke is present." 
The doctor on that date administered hyperten-
sion medicine and "the patient's response was more 
marked than is usually seen," and it caused an "excessive 
drop in blood pressure," and Mr. Johnson fainted. He 
was immediately hospitalized. (R. 54) The doctor also 
noted that when extremely high blood pressure is alle-
viated, there may be damage to the small arteries in the 
brain, and this could affect the patient's mental process-
es. (R. 68) Dr. Fulstow further noted that this damage 
to the small arteries interferes with the nutrition of the 
brain. (R. 68) He also noted that Mr. Johnson suffered 
at this same time from "moderately severe" arterio-
sclerosis. This also would interfere with circulation. 
(R. 61) 
Mr. Johnson was placed in the hospital on April 
30th and released May 2, 1956. He was only out of the 
hospital one day, and then was re-admitted to the hospital 
on ~fay 3rd, because of a bad nose bleed, which in the 
opinion of Dr. Fulstow was caused by high blood pres-
sure. (R. 63) Mr. Johnson was released from the hospital 
again May 6th. The doctor noted that he made an emer-
gency house call to attend Mr. Johnson at noon on May 
15th. Mr. Johnson had fainted and was found on the 
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floor. "His eyes were up in his head and he was drooling 
at the mouth. He had wet all over his clothes." The 
family changed his clothing and called the doctor. :i\Ir. 
Johnson was immediately again placed in the hospital. 
(R.171, 100, 64) 
During this period of hospitalization, beginning :May 
15, 1956, and ending l\Iay 20th (the date he signed the 
deed) the hospital records show that l\Ir. Johnson was 
out of his bed "wandering" around the hall. The attend-
ing nurse noted on the hospital records that l\Ir. John-
son "apparently does not know where he is. He was up 
and about and apparently doesn't know where he is.'' 
(R. 93) He was released from the hospital on May 20, 
1956, and it was on this date-the very day of his release 
-that Calvin got the deed to the business property and 
had the contract of sale and will signed. All were exe-
cuted in Calvin's presence and at Calvin's hmne. (R. 510, 
505, 522, Exs. 1, 2, 1-l) 
In June, 1956, ~Ir. Johnson had a head cold accom-
panied by a fainting spell. The doctor said that following 
this "he showed definite confusion" for a while. These 
periods of confusion were aln1ost steady. (R. 57) The 
doctor made a house call on June Sth. l\lr. Johnson suf-
fered a stroke on June 23rd and was again hospitalized. 
(R. 64) 
~Ir. Johnson was 73 yean;; of age. (R. ±9) Running 
through this Pntire period of tiine, he suffered frmn nose 
bleeds, (R. 56) He had severe sick headaches. (R. 35) 
l-Iis eyP sight was bad}~~ iinpaired. (R. 73) His heart 
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was enlarged about 100 per cent. (R. 65-6) He was not 
mentally alert (R. 58) and had little interest in his busi-
ness. (R. 35) He would lay on a bed in the back of his 
store, ''Tould not wait on customers and would leave his 
store unlocked. (R. 35, 191) When in Salt Lake, he would 
think he was in Kanab, (R. 108) and did not know his 
younger grandchildren. (R. 258) He had to have help 
shaving and bathing. (R. 254) He did not have control 
over either his bowels or urine. (R. 254) 
He did not know when he had to void, (R. 58) and 
various witnesses testified that he frequently wet his 
clothing. (R. 25-±, 40, 171) According to Dr. Fulstow 
this would indicate he was "not in full possession of his 
mental facilities." (R. 58) In October, 1955, he locked 
himself in a service station restroom, talked irrationally, 
complained about there being no toilet paper in the rest-
room, when in fact there was. ( R. 172, 39) 
Throughout this period of time he had few inhibi-
tions about dress. On various occasions and at various 
times, beginning as early as 1955, Mr. Johnson would 
come into the room where adult women were present 
in various stages of undress, sometimes with only his 
garments on, and on one occasion without clothing on at 
all. (R. 35, 175, 176, 252, 377) He had difficulty orienting 
himself as to time and place. (R. 58, 57) 
We submit that from the foregoing evidence, the 
court properly found that at least since the Spring of 
1955 Arthur Johnson was seriously ill and was mentally 
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and physically incapacitated from attending to his ordi-
nary business affairs. 
(c) SEVERAL WITNESSES TESTIFIED THAT ARTHUR 
NEEDED HELP WITH HIS BUSINESS AFFAIRS. 
William J. Mackelprang testified: 
"I think that Carrie kind of took the pep out 
of him, her death. 
"Oh, I think it kind of made a difference in 
him." ( R. 120) 
Dr. Fulstow said : 
"A combination of a number of circumstances 
have resulted in what appears to be interference 
with his mental function." (R. 61) 
"Q. Now, Dr. Fulstow, from your observa-
tion of Mr. Johnson's condition during the period 
of your treatment, connnencing in April, 1956, and 
extending through the present time, what would 
be your opinion as to whether :Jir. Johnson was 
competent during that period to handle his own 
affairs consistently and without help from some-
one~ 
''A. I would be inclined to think that during 
that period of time he would have need of help 
in handling his own affairs." (R. 75) 
His brother Vern on Johnson testified that not since 
1955 has he "been ahle to function properly in a business 
"\vay; that is my honest opinion.~' (R. 111) 
(d) ARTHUR JOHNSON LET CALVIN C. JOHNSON TAKE 
OVER THE ACTIVE MANAGEMENT OF HIS BUSI-
NESS AFFAIRS, AND CALVIN OCCUPIED A POSI-
TION OF CONFIDENCE AND TRUST. 
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Appellants contend that there is no evidence to sus-
tain the finding that Calvin took over the management 
of most of Arthur Johnson's properties and business 
affairs, or that Arthur had placed considerable confi-
dence and trust in Calvin. We submit that the evidence 
almost conclusively shows that he did. 
Several witnesses testified that Mr. Johnson's wife 
Carrie, was prior to her death, the "business head" and 
had assumed the active management of the business 
property. (R. 27, 111, 119, 166) Arthur Johnson was 
deeply affected by her death in July of 1953. (R. 120) 
He was ill at the time, and was hospitalized much of the 
Fall and earl:~ Winter of 1953, as is outlined above. The 
need for help no doubt existed, and, in any event, numer-
ous witnesses testified that Calvin took over the active 
management of Arthur's business affairs. (R. 27, 111, 
120, 166, 167) This is further borne out by the docu-
mentary evidence and the testimony of the various ten-
ants. There are checks going back to 1955, made payable 
to Arthur Johnson by numerous tenants but deposited 
to his account by Calvin. See, for example plaintiffs' 
Ex. 3 and 9 and R. 473, 558-66. These checks conclusively 
show that Calvin was receiving substantial amounts of 
rent and placing it in the Arthur Johnson bank 
account. 
There are also checks conclusively showing that Cal-
vin Johnson was authorized, and did draw checks against 
the Arthur Johnson account. For example, the attorney 
fee which wa~ paid to Attorney Fenton for drawing 
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the deed to the business property is dated November 14, 
1956, and is drawn against Arthur Johnson's account and 
signed by Calvin. (Ex. 16) See also a check dated :May 
8, 1957, drawn to Frank Farnsworth for $40.00, and an-
other check to a Mr. Meeks, dated June 12, 1956. (Ex. 8) 
Both of those checks were drawn against Arthur John-
son's account by Calvin. 
The testimony of the various witnesses leaves no 
doubt that Calvin was in active managernent of the 
properties of his father. Respondent X arvol Johnson 
testified affirmatively that after his mother's death in 
1953, Calvin took charge of their father's business prop-
erty. (R. 27) Narvol also testified that his father didn't 
show much interest in handling the business rentals. (R. 
35) "He just lay on the bed sick. Customers would come 
into the store, and he wouldn't wait on them.***" (R. 35) 
Vern on Johnson was of the opinion that since his 
prostate operations Arthur was not able to discharge 
his business responsibilities. (R. 111) 
Della Johnson also testified affinnatively that Cal-
vin ran his father's business after the n1other, Carrie, 
died. (R.166, 167) 
Respondent LaFaun Fle1ning testified that her 
father was very forgetful by April of 1955. (R. :252) 
N arvol also testified that his father owned a Pack-
ard automobile; that Calvin traded it in for an automo-
bile for Calvin (R. 21). He also testified that Calvin 
received all of the range rights-a 300 head permit-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
which had belonged to his father. (R. 22, 23) Narvol was 
asked who operated their father's cattle now, and he an-
swered that they are operated by Calvin. LaFaun Flem-
ing also testified that Arthur Johnson couldn't get 
around by himself outside the house; that this was be-
cause of a combination of physical and mental disabili-
ties. (H. 254) Mrs. Fleming also testified that after her 
rnother's death, her father was depressed; that he was not 
able to care for his business affairs and "he turned-
Calvin took charge of his business." (R. 270) 
Even the witnesses called by the defendants eon-
finned Arthur Johnson's disinterest in his business af-
fairs and Calvin's active management. l\1r. Jones was a 
tenant of Arthur Johnson. He paid Arthur when he 
could, but otherwise paid the rent to Calvin. (R. 395) He 
testified that he discussed renewing his lease with Calvin, 
and that Arthur "may" have been present. (R. 396, 397) 
He needed to get the roof fixed on the building he was 
renting frorn Arthur but he said that he saw Calvin about 
it. (R. 398) When he was asked if it was not Calvin, he 
talked to on the roof, he said, "We talked to both of 
them." He ·was then asked in effect if his principal con-
versation about the roof was not with Calvin, and he 
answered "Yes." (R. 398) 
Sylvan W. Johnson, who was also called by the de-
fendants, testified on cross-examination that Arthur 
Johnson told hirn to pay the rent to Calvin, because he, 
(Arthur) was probably going to California. He also 
testified that he kept delivering the payments to Calvin, 
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although the checks were made payable to Arthur. (R. 
4:42) He testified about taking over the grocery store in 
February of 1956 from Arthur Johnson, but that Calvin 
helped him take the inventory. (R. 451, 452) 
Mr. Neaf Swapp was another tenant of Arthur 
Johnson. He took over the lease previously made to one 
Garn Hamblin. When that lease expired in 1956, he 
talked to Calvin about it-not to Arthur. Still, it was his 
understanding that he was leasing from Arthur, and he 
made his rent checks payable to Arthur, but he delivered 
them to Calvin. (R. 473) 
There is other evidence of the same type. We think 
the record thus conclusively shows that the father did 
permit Calvin to manage his affairs and placed trust and 
confidence in his son Calvin. 
(e) THERE ARE NUMEROUS ABNORMAL ACTIONS, 
SOME NOTED AS EARLY AS 1954. 
We will not separately review here all of the items 
of abnormal conduct, but they were 1nany, and further 
support the findings to the effect that Arthur has been 
1nentally and physically incompetent since at least the 
Spring of 1955. In 1954 he buried his 1noney in the base-
Inent of the store. (R. 195) At about this smne tune he 
was asked about $30,000 "·hieh his wife had kept l1iclden 
in the store, and he said, he just "forgot" where she said 
she put it. (R. 2S) In the Fall of 1954: he ·'just forgot'' a 
vauable lease of State School lands in Arizona. (R. 27) 
On several oceas ions in 1955, l\Ir. Johnson caine down-
town with his trousers unbuttoned-just holding on to 
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his belt. (R. 35) 
N arvol said that Mr. Johnson was in so much pain 
in the Spring of 1955 "that he didn't know hardly any-
thing" (R. 38) In April of 1955, when he was staying in 
Salt Lake with his daughter, LaFaun, he would on many 
occasions forget to dress. (R. 252) He would forget to 
eat sometimes, and other times LaFaun would feed hin1 
and only a few minutes later he would complain that she 
hadn't fed him, and she would fix food again, and he 
would again eat. (R. 252, 253) 
In April of 1955, he was afraid to go out of the 
house in Salt Lake City- afraid he couldn't find his way 
around. (R. 332) During his stay at LaFaun's house in 
April of 1955, her husband had to bathe and shave Mr. 
Johnson. (R. 333) He never bathed himself even a single 
time. (R. 336) It was also in April of 1955 that Mr. 
Johnson had a bowel movement and "messed all over the 
bed and floor" and Mr. Fleming testified "each time I 
bathed him, well, he had messed in his garments." (R. 
333) 
By January 1, 1955, he had lost interest in handling 
the business of his rentals. (R. 35) It was at this time 
that he would lay on the bed sick and not wait on custo-
mers and would leave the store unlocked. (R. 35) By the 
Spring of 1955 N arvol noticed that Mr. Johnson "suf-
fered from lapse of memory," and that he could not make 
decisions. (R. 36) It was in the Spring of 1955 that he 
would rent cabins to various Indians on one day and call 
the officers to put them out the next day-then he would 
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rent to them again. (R. 36) 
His brother Vernon testified that on :\fay 21, 1955, 
Mr. Johnson signed a check on which the signature was 
so poorly made that Vernon did not think it would go 
through the bank. (R. 114) Vern on also said that at this 
time Mr. Johnson, while staying at LaFaun's house in 
Salt Lake, thought he was in Kanab. (R.108) 
All of the above transpired prior to the time he 
signed the deed giving Calvin all of the field properties 
valued at $12,650.00 on July 20, 1955, and preceded by 
more than a year the deed to the business property, on 
1fay 20, 1956. In the meantime, everyone recognized that 
1fr. Johnson was getting progressively worse. As time 
elapsed, he got more careless about coming among people 
while he was undressed. (R. 252, 95, 377). In the Fall of 
1955 he locked himself in a public restroon1 at a service 
station and made a terrible fuss because he said there 
wasn't any toilet paper, when in fact there was. (R. 39) 
It was in Dece1nber of 1955 that he was wandering 
around the hospital ·without knowing where he was, (R. 
92) and this happened again on ~fay lS. 1956. (R. 93) By 
the Spring of 1956 he would get confused about directions 
in l{anab. (R. 125) He stated that he wanted to go to 
the post office to get his hair cut. (R. 30) He eon1plained 
that thP~' were putting ha~, in the house. (R. 175) He 
didn't recognize his daughter-in-law. Della, in whose 
house lw had liYed a eonsiderable tune. (R.. 377) He told 
of taking an air cireulating fan to be repaired-that he 
took it in his Packard. He didn•t have the Packard, and 
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he hadn't taken the fan. (R. 174) On July 16, 1956, Della 
advised him that his own father had died. Mr. Johnson 
just smiled. That was his only reaction. (R. 188-9) 
(f) THE CONDUCT OF CALVIN AND ARTHUR AFTER 
THE DATE OF THE DEED SHOWS THAT NEITHER 
TREATED THE PROPERTY AS BELONGING TO 
CALVIN. 
There is considerable evidence demonstrating that 
even after the deeds were recorded neither Calvin nor his 
father Arthur considered Calvin to be the owner of the 
property. It is clear that the deed to the business prop-
erty was given to Calvin on May 20, 1956, on the day 
Arthur was temporarily released from the hospital. (R. 
505) Thereafter, if the property were his, it would have 
been logical for Calvin to notify the tenants that he had 
acquired the property from his father, and that they 
should make their rent checks payable to Calvin. This 
was not done. In most instances for more than a year, 
and continuing nearly to the time when respondents dis-
covered the deed, and confronted ·Calvin with it, the ten-
ants all thought they were still renting from Arthur and 
still made the checks payable to Arthur. (R. 420-8; 443-8; 
+73) The checks were being deposited into Arthur's 
account. 
~[ore damaging still to the position now taken by 
the appellants is the testimony of G. C. Bonham, who was 
a witness called by the appellants. He testified that he 
made a lease for part of the Johnson property and took 
the property over on J nne 6, 1956. This was some sixteen 
days after Calvin allegedly had become the owner of the 
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property. This lease was introduced as Ex. Q. It names 
Arthur Johnson as lessor and is dated June 1, 1956. (R. 
556) By this time Calvin had already recorded the deed, 
conveying this property to Calvin absolutely. (Ex. 1) 
Calvin and Arthur both signed the lease, but the lease 
names only Arthur as the lessor. Since Calvin signed 
the lease, it is conclusively shown that Calvin knew that 
his father was making a lease on the property after Cal-
vin claimed to own it. Mr. Bonham admitted that Arthur 
Johnson was not present when he discussed this lease 
with ·Calvin. (R. 560) But when it came time to sign the 
lease, Mr. Bonham picked Calvin up at the pool hall and 
they went to Arthur's to get Arthur to sign the lease. 
Nothing was said about Calvin owning or buying the 
property, or about Arthur having conveyed it away. (R. 
561) On June 12, 1956, the first rent check was made out 
by Mr. Bonham, and it was made payable only to Arthur 
Johnson. (R. 562) The check was endorsed, "Arthur 
Johnson by CCJ," and it was put in Arthur Johnson's 
bank account. (R. 556) Subsequent checks for rent on 
this lease throughout the Fall of 1956 and the Spring of 
1957 were made payable to Arthur Johnson. (R. 564, 565) 
They were all deposited to Arthur Johnson ·s account. 
In April of 1957, the first check was 1nade payable to 
Calvin, because Calvin told ~Ir. Bonha1n to make jt out 
that way. (R. 567) 
This is not the onl~· lease Inade by )[ r. Johnson after 
the d<><>d to Calvin. \Yitness X eaf Swapp. who also was 
ealled h~· appellants, testified that he had been renting 
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business properties from Arthur since October of 1956. 
(R. 367) He took over the lease of a l\Ir. Hamblin. When 
the lease expired in 1956, he went to 'Calvin to talk about 
a renewal. (R. 473) When he was asked at what date in 
1956 he re-negotiated his lease on the property, he an-
swered, ''It "'aS in October, I believe." (R. 474) Begin-
ning in November of 1956, and continuing for several 
months thereafter, he made his rent checks payable to 
Arthur Johnson, (R. 456) and while he renegotiated the 
extension of the lease with Calvin, it was in Arthur's 
name. (R. 47-l:) 
So in at least two instances after Calvin got the abso-
lute deed to the property on l\Iay 20, 1956, he took the 
primary role in renegotiating two leases, one on June 6, 
1956, and the other in October of 1956. In both instances 
the new leases were made in the name of Arthur Johnson 
as lessor. The rent checks were made payable to Arthur 
and deposited into Arthur's account by Calvin. 
Calvin 1nay have been able to enlighten the court 
as to why after he held an absolute deed to the property. 
he continued to negotiate leases for his father and in 
his father's name, why both he and his father signed 
the Bonham lease, and why he received rent checks pay-
able to his father and put them in his father's bank 
account. But although he was in court throughout the 
trial, he did not take the witness stand to explain any 
of these transactions. He occupied a position of trust, 
both because of his family relationship, and because 
he managed his father's business. He, as we will note 
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in more detail below, had a duty to speak, if there were 
any explanation for this conduct. He elected to remain 
silent, and the law requires the dra,ving of all reasonable 
inferences against him. 
There are many other things indicating that the 
father did not realize he had parted with the title. He 
talked to N arvol and N arvol 's ·wife Della to endeavor 
to get them to buy his business property in the Fall of 
1956. (R. 184) This was long after he had allegedly 
deeded it to Calvin. He tried to sell the lot on which 
the Dairy Queen is located to a ~fr. Crandall of th~ 
Salina Bank in October, 1956. ( R. 177, Ex. 5) This 
clearly shows that Arthur thought he still owned it. In 
August of 1956 he talked in terms of dividing the prop-
erty into equal thirds for his children. This 'Yas long 
after the alleged transfer to Calvin. (R. 185) After ~Iay 
20, 1956, he told N arvol to put a trailer court on part 
of the property. N arvol said, "what will the other kids 
do f' and Arthur said: 
"To the devil with the other kids. If I want 
to put a trailer Court in there, that is 1ny prop-
erty, and I can do what I want with it." (R. 186) 
The water assessn1ent for the irrigation water for 
the field property was paid by Arthur Johnson as late 
as 1957. (R. 155) This is inconsistent with the convey-
aJwc> to Calvin on July :20, 1955. 
Two other things of slight significance in then1selves 
i-~how at lPa~t that :Jf r. Johnson did not understand the 
deed and contract. I~.,ir~t. Narvol's nmne is frequently 
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misspelled in the documents. The father ought to have 
noticed this. Secondly, the deed included all of Lot 3-
yet the Peach's Trail End Cafe had been sold from this 
tract several years before. Mr. Johnson should also have 
noted this. 
All this conduct is absolutely inconsistent with Cal-
vin's present contention that his father fully knew and 
realized that he was conveying to Calvin the field prop-
erty in 1955 and the business property on May 20, 1956. 
Calvin had actual knowledge and participated in most 
of the transactions where Arthur still claimed the prop-
erty. If it was not Arthur's-why didn't Calvin say so~ 
Calvin not only did not claim the property, but 
continued to admit Arthur's ownership. After May 20, 
1956, when Calvin had title to the property, he was asked 
by N arvol about Calvin's plans to construct the Dairy 
Queen on part of this property. N arvol said: "How are 
you going to borrow money on Dad's property to build 
a cafe on Dad's property~'' Calvin answered: "I am go-
ing to borrow it on insurance." (R. 43-4) He was asked 
if he was going to borrow on his Dad's insurance, and he 
said, no, he would borrow it on his own insurance. N arvol 
told Calvin that Calvin had no interest in the property 
and should not build on it, and ·Calvin said he was going 
to build on it anyway, and then said: 
"That will be more rentals, we will have more 
to divide up, $300.00 a month more." (R. 44-5) 
Calvin also told his sister LaFaun in the Fall of 
1956: 
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"Well, I have to pay the taxes and the in-
surance and Dad's expenses, and all the rest is 
put aside to be set apart, to be divided." (R. 266) 
Calvin was asked about the large amount of money 
their mother had hidden, and he said: 
"Yes, that's set aside. That's put away. Yes, 
it is going to be divided equally when everything 
is taken care of." (R. 267) 
It is also of importance to note that although rentals 
1n excess of $1,000 per 1nonth were being collected by 
Calvin for Arthur, Arthur had only 97 cents in the bank 
account at Panguitch, and $267 in Salina at the time of 
the trial. 
(g) THE NATURE OF THE TRANSACTION ITSELF 
DEMONSTRATES A LACK OF BUSINESS SENSE. 
Attorney Fenton wrote a letter dated .A.pril 2-±, 1956, 
(plaintiffs' Ex. 15) concerning the purc~ase agreement 
on the business property. The letter ·was not addressed 
to Arthur, but to Calvin. In this letter he notes that 
"in the office we talked of leaving the title in shape so 
that you (Calvin) could n1ortgage the sa~ne if you felt 
it desirable. At another ti1ne in Kanab we talked of put-
ting title in escrow until paid for or of passing title to 
you and executing a 1nortgage frmn you to ~-\rt on the 
property, to guarantee the payment of the purch::lse.'' 
I Ie advised Calvin to disenss these security arrange-
Inents vPr~· carefully with Arthur. Frmn this letter, two 
things are el<'ar: First as late as April ~-l-. 1956, Arthur 
:-;till did not fulJ~c understand tl1e Inatter. for ~-\ttorney 
Fenton wantPd to be sure CnlYin explained it to ~-\rthur; 
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and second, the explaining was left for Calvin to do. 
Attorney Fenton apparently did not talk ·with Arthur 
again until the day the deed and contract were signed. 
If it took a normal day or two for the letter to reach 
Calvin, he would only have had three or four days to talk 
to Arthur before Arthur fainted and was hospitalized 
on April 30, 1956. 
From April 30th to May 20, 1956, Arthur was 
seriously ill, as is outlined above. He was wandering 
around the halls of the hospital on May 18th not knowing 
where he was, etc. On May 20th, the day he was re-
leased from the hospital, Calvin got the deed and con-
tract. They were signed in Calvin's home and in Calvin's 
presence. (R. 505, 510, 522) 
Since Attorney Fenton had left to Calvin the re-
sponsibility for explaining the entire transaction to Mr. 
Johnson, it would be very interesting to know whether 
Calvin ever did so, but Calvin elected to remain silent, 
did not take the witness stand. Again, under well estab-
lished principles of law, his silence points the finger of 
guilt and the court can only infer that had he testified, 
the truth from his own lips would have been more 
damaging to him than an inference which the court can 
draw from his failure to talk. It is reasonable to infer 
that Calvin did not explain it. Mr. Fenton had recom-
mended some security arrangement, had asked Calvin 
to explain this to Arthur. The contract provided for 
none. A deed absolute in form was delivered and re-
corded. The manner in which the contract and deed 
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were handled shows a complete lack of business under-
standing. When coupled with the fact that Arthur and 
Calvin both thereafter consistently treated the property 
as still belonging to Arthur, the evidence shows con-
clusively that Arthur did not know what he was doing 
and was not in full control of his mental faculties. 
The transaction which was finally executed had no 
protection in it whatever for Arthur. The agreement 
of purchase which was executed at the same time was 
not recorded (R. 371) and it is reasonable to assume that 
but for this lawsuit, the agreement to purchase would 
never have seen the "light of day.'' If Arthur Johnson 
had been in control of his mental faculties sufficient to 
permit him to manage his business affairs, and he had 
been told about placing the deed in escrow or taking 
a mortgage back, the very least he would have done 
would have been to see that the agreement of purchase 
was recorded along with the deed. The fact that he would 
turn over to Calvin absolute title to $150,000 "\Yorth of 
property without any security, itself suggests lack of 
mental capacity, but the further fact that he would not 
record or require Calvin to record, or request his at-
torney to record the contract of purchase, is sin1ply out 
of harmony '.Yith expected conduct of any experienced 
lnu;;inessman. Calvin, because of his fmnily ties and the 
eontrol he had taken over ~-\.rthur's business, certainly 
owed a fidueiary duty to give Arthur son1e guidance and 
protP<'iion. He gave hiin none at all. 
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Reference to the agreement itself shows a further 
lack of business understanding. The purchase price 
most favorably construed provided for payment of only 
$50,000. (Ex. 2) If :Mr. Johnson had died, it might have 
been nothing. The record stands absolutely uncontra-
dicted to the effect that the property had a value of 
$150,000. Appellants state in their brief that there was 
some conflict, but there was not any. N arvol fixed the 
value at $150,000, (R. 17) and two independent business-
men, who owned similar main street property, each 
expressed a similiar opinion. See the testimony of Carl 
)icDonald (R. 228) and Odell Watson. (R. 234) Further, 
the agreement provided for payments of only $300.00 per 
month, or :1;3 of the net income, and did not require the 
payment of interest. 
The combined rents on the business property were 
in the neighborhood of $1,300.00 per month. (R. 14-20, 
179-82, -!-!2-9) This isn't in dispute. The rents were as 
follows: 
Drug Store ______________________________ $100.00 
Snack Bar------------------------------ 75.00 
Gift Shop________________________________ 80.00 
Service Station______________________ 75.00 
Pool Hall ________________________________ 200.00 
Grocery Store________________________ 80.00 
Clothing Store________________________ 100.00 
Dairy Queen -------------------------- 300.00 
Home -------------------------------------- 80.00 
Old Frame Building____________ 150.00 
Apartment Above Store ______ 100.00 
Total $1340.00 
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He also had some cabins renting for $15.00 per month 
each. With the very property covered by the contract 
yielding a rental in excess of $1300.00 per month, thE~ 
fixing of the payment as low as $300.00 or lower if net 
income were down and providing that the balance could 
be paid without interest, are contrary to all common 
business sense. 
(h) CALVIN'S APPARENT EFFORT TO ·CONCEAL HIS 
ACQUISITION OF THE PROPERTY ALSO CON_ 
DEMNS HIM. 
If these transactions were open and above board 
and expressed the desires of Arthur Johnson, and if 
Arthur Johnson were in full control of his mental facul-
ties, Calvin could have avoided the possibilit~T of this 
lawsuit by transacting this business in the open, so that 
his other brother and his sister could know about it and 
could talk with their father about it. But "the guilty 
runneth before they are pursued." Calvin actively en-
deavored to conceal the acquisition of the property by 
him. First, if the field property were fully paid for at 
the time the deed was 1nade out on July 20, 1955, there 
is absolutely no reason why he should not have recorded 
it then, but he did not record it until January of 1958, 
several1nonths after this law·suit was filed. (Ex. I) Also 
he failed to take the witness stand and explain this at 
the trial. 
There were 1nany situations w·hich called for Calvin 
to speak out. First, he was confronted by the discover~· 
of the deed to the business property in J\Iay of 1957. ~.\_ 
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rather violent family quarrel ensued. Calvin acknow-
ledged that he had the deed to the business property and 
said he was going to keep it. The respondents were 
complaining that it was not fair, but Calvin didn't 
mention that he was buying the property under a con-
tract, nor that he also had the deed to the field property. 
and the rattle and the other property. (R. 47, 26-!) The 
parties had a hearing on August 6, 1957, concerning the 
competency of Arthur Johnson and went into many of 
these transactions, and again Calvin did not tell the court 
or the parties about the deed to the field property. 
Arthur Johnson had a vacant tract of land. Calvin 
constructed a Dairy Queen building on it. The respon-
dents asked him about this and asked in effect, •'How 
come you are putting a building on Dad's property 1'' 
Calvin didn't tell them about having the deed, but said 
he was going to borrow on some of his (Calvin's) in-
surance. He also volunteered that this was a good thing 
for all three of them; that there would be more money 
and property to divide up; that it meant an additional 
$300.00 in rent for them. (R. 44-5) At this very time he 
was holding the deed and was really putting the Dairy 
Queen building on property, which he now claims to 
have owned. He was not building it for the benefit of 
the three. But he didn't tell them the truth about this. 
Again let it be noted that Calvin did not take the witness 
stand to deny these conversations, nor explain his con-
duct. 
Further, Calvin recorded the deed to the business 
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property in June, only two short weeks after he re-
ceived it. (Ex. 1) But he didn't record the contract which 
would have shown an obligation on his part to pay at 
least something for the property. (R. 371) He did not 
notify any of the tenants of the alleged change in 
ownership, so that except by actually checking the re-
cords and discovering the deed, no one would know about 
it. F.e let the tenants continue to write their rent checks 
payable to Arthur. He continued to put the rent checks 
in Arthur's account. (R. 420-8; -±-13-8; 473-9) The sum 
total of the rent checks, as noted, were under any pos-
sible construction of the testimony more than three times 
his monthly payment, as shown by the contract. Since 
the deferred balance did not bear interest, he had abso-
lutely no advantage in prepayment, and a deposit to 
Arthur Johnson's account of amounts in excess of the 
monthly contract payment simply cannot even raise an 
inference that these were payments on the contract. 
Further, since Calvin did not testify. any inference 
drawn must be against him and not for him. In short, 
he simply didn't want Arthur or the other children or 
the tenants to lmow that he clain1ed to be the mvner 
of the property. He was angry when confronted with 
the discovery of the deed. He told his sister he had 
hated her all his life, and he welc01ned tllis chance to 
get even with her. (R. 47, 264) His Yiolent flare of te1nper 
when confronted with the deed suggests that he had 
"been caught" and he resented it. He did not then try 
to defend the transaction on the basis that it was an 
arm'~ length negotiated sale. He didn •t tell the1n he had 
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agreed to pay $50,000 for the property, or that he had 
been making the payments. He simply said it was his, 
and he was going to keep it, knowing that his father by 
this time in l\t1ay of 1957 was hopelessly incompetent, 
and could not contradict him. 
The trial court found that while occupying a posi-
tion of confidence and trust Calvin imposed on his father. 
The very day he got out of the hospital and while 
.Mr. Johnson ·was seriously ill, Calvin took him to Cal-
vin's home, and in the absence of the other children had 
him enter into an unconscionable, unreasonable trans-
action. The evidence fully sustains these findings and 
both Calvin's and Arthur's actions thereafter demon-
strate Arthur did not understand what he was doing. 
(i) THE COURT SHOULD INFER FROM THE FAILURE 
OF APPELLANTS TO TESTIFY, THAT THEIR 
TESTIMONY, INSTEAD OF REFUTING, WOULD 
HAVE SUPPORTED THE INFERENCES AGAINST 
THEM. 
We have noted above that neither of appellants 
elected to testify. Both were sitting in court throughout 
every minute and day of the trial. Neither placed him-
self upon the witness stand to vindicate what he had 
done in connection with securing this valuable property 
from an old and sick man. Calvin was content to attempt 
through his counsel on cross-examination to malign the 
integrity and character of his brother and sister, but was 
not sufficiently convinced of the propriety of his own 
actions to submit to the same type of interrogation. 
His counsel states in the brief that Calvin was a "sober" 
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man and that he was not addicted to drink. There is not 
one word of evidence to this effect. 
Under the cases, it does not matter that respondents 
could have called Calvin as an adverse witness. The 
defense was for Calvin to make. When he elected to 
remain mute, the only inference the court can draw is 
that the truth would have been more damaging to him 
than the strongest inferences which could be drawn from 
his silence. 
The cases are absolutely uniform in so holding. 
The matter is discussed in some detail in "\Vigmore on 
Evidence,'' Third Edition, Sec. 289, page 172. Wigmore 
quotes with approval from the case of Attorney General 
v. Pelleteir, 240 ~lass. 264, 134 NE 407, as follo"Ws: 
"Instant impulse, spontaneous anxiety and 
deep yearning, to repel charges thus impunging 
his honor would be expected from an innocent 
man. Refusal to testify himself or to call avail-
able witnesses in his o"\vn behalf under such cir-
cumstances warrants inferences unfa\orable to 
respondent. It is conduct in the nature of an ad-
mission. It is evidence against hiin. Tins principle 
of law has long been established and consistently 
applied. The reason is that it is an attribute of 
human nature to resent such imputations. In the 
face of such accusations. n1en connnonlv do not 
remain mute, but voice their denials "ith~ earnest-
ness, if the:v can do so with honesty. Culpabilit:-
alone seals their lips. The law siinply reeognizes 
the natural probative force of conduct contrarY 
to that of the ordinan~ 1nan of integrit~~." · 
Professor \Vigmore states that this principle of law 
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i::; ahnost uniformly followed. He cites the case of United 
States v. illammoth Oil Company, 1-t F. 2d 705, which 
was affirmed by the United States Supre1ne Court, and 
states that the analysis of Judge Kenyon is an excellent 
statement of the rule. The discussion on this point begins 
at page 729. The court in part noted: 
"These gentlemen have the right to remain 
silent, to evade, to refuse to furnish information, 
and thus to defy the government to prove its 
case; but a court of equity has the right to draw 
reasonable and proper inferences from all the 
circumstances in the case, and especially from 
the silence of Secretary Fall, and from the failure 
of Sinclair to testify. It is not sufficient answer 
that the government m~ght have used Sinclair as 
a witness. He was properly a wvtness for the 
defense.'' 
The trial court had noted that the entire trans-
action had been revealed by other witnesses, and that 
the failure of Sinclair to testify was, therefore, not im-
portant and might only raise the inference that he failed 
to testify because he knew nothing further, but the 
appellate court disagreed and said: 
''We do not reach the same conclusion under 
the record. We fail to perceive why, under all the 
circumstances revealed in this case, it should be 
presumed that Sinclair knew nothing more than 
the other witnesses.*** With important and con-
trolling facts in Sinclair's possession, and with a 
train of circumstances that aroused the gravest 
suspicion as to corruption practiced in securing 
the lease laid at his door, his failure to testify 
is a 1natter of deep significance. There is a pre-
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sumption in the law that, if a litigant have facts 
within his knowledge and refuses to reveal them, 
it is presumed that if revealed they would be 
against him." 
See also Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. Co.~- Ellis, 54 Fed. 481, 
4 CCA 454. 
The cases all hold, of course, that there must be 
"laid at the door" of the defendant by evidence tending 
to show improper conduct, a situation ·which would 
induce a normal man to speak. Clearly the evidence does 
this here. Calvin is accused of imposing on his aged, 
sick and incapacitated father. If he paid full value for 
the field property in an arm's length transaction in 1955, 
all he had to do to completely clear his name was to 
tell the court what he paid, how he paid it, and the cir-
cumstances under which his father deeded it to him, but 
he chose to ren1ain silent. The sa1ne is true as to the 
agreement of sale and the deed to the business property. 
Evidence had been adduced to show· that the property 
was worth more than $150,000; that it produced rents 
of Inore than $1300 per nwnth. He had procured a deed, 
without paying anything for it. and had kept hidden a 
contract purporting to let hnn buy the property for 
on<•-third of its vahw. without interest. and '"-ith 1nonthly 
pa~·nH'nts in an a1nount far less than the rental. He 
\ra~ confronted with evidence that he and his father 
had both thereafter treated the property as still be-
longing to the father. He had heard the testi1nony that 
liP lmd ht>Pn collecting the rent and handling his father's 
propPrties-dra\\·ing checks on his father's account. He 
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had heard the testimony that with $1300.00 per month 
coming in as rent, the father's bank accounts were empty. 
Certainly the reason for him to speak had been "laid at 
the door." He elected to remain mute. The court, there-
fore, properly concluded that he had no explanation; 
that the father did think that the property was still his 
and did not realize that he had parted with title. Thus, 
the strong evidence of physical and mental incapacity, 
is corroborated by the admissions and inferences that 
flow from the defendants' election to remain silent. 
(j) THERE WAS A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND 
CONFIDENCE BETWEEN C A L VI N AND HIS 
FATHER, WHICH PLACED THE BURDEN ON CAL-
VIN TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVI-
DENCE THAT THE TRANSFER OF THE PROPERTY 
TO HIM WAS PROPER. 
Where a fiduciary relationship exists, and there is 
a transfer without adequate consideration, the burden 
is on the donee to prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the donor had his full mental faculties and 
acted without fraud or undue influence on the part of 
the donee. This principle is recognized by the recent 
Utah case of Jardine v Archibald, 3 Utah 2d 88, 279 
P. 2d 454. In that case the trial court had found that 
there was no fraud or undue influence; that the mother 
had full control of her mental faculties and had made a 
gift to her two younger children because she wanted to. 
The appellents had urged that there was a presumption 
of fraud created by the fiduciary relationship which 
there existed, and that this presumption was even strong 
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enough to warrant the reversal of the trial court's find-
ing that there was no fraud or mental incapacity. In 
affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court recognized 
the existence of the presumption, but held under the 
evidence of that case that the presumption had been 
rebutted. 
The trial court had found that a confidential re-
lationship existed-as the trial court has found here. 
The evidence upon which that finding was based showed 
only that the donor was eighty years old, that she was 
suffering from high blood pressure, hardening of the 
arteries, and headaches, being forgetful at times and 
even eccentric. In addition, one of the donees took care 
of her finances and operated her farm. The Supreme 
Court said this evidence "clearly sustains" a finding 
that a confidential relationship existed. 
All of these elements are present here. The trial 
court in this case has found that ~Ir. Johnson was sick 
and mentally incompetent. In both cases the relationship 
was one of parent and child. In both cases, in addition 
to the blood relationship, the donee 1nanaged the finances 
for the parent. In both cases the trial court found that 
a confidential and fiduciary relationship existed and 
under the holding of the J a.rd ine rase. the evidence 
"elearly sustains" this finding. The consequence of such 
a holding is noted in the Jardine rase as follows: 
"It is well settled that where a fiduciarY or 
confidential relationship exists between the d~nor 
and donee, equity raises a presumption against 
the validit~· of such transactions and the burden 
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is cm;t upon the donee to prove their validity and 
that there was no fraud or undue influence by 
proving .affirmatively and by clear and convincing 
evidence compliance with equitable requisites. 
This is because there is implied in every fiduciary 
or confidential relationship a superiority held by 
one of the parties over the other. * * * Whether 
the donee has sustained his burden of proof nec-
essarily depends upon the facts adduced in each 
case." 
Thus under the ruling of the J ardi'ne case, the bur-
den was on ·Calvin to prove not by a mere preponder-
ance, but by "clear and convincing proof" that the 
transaction \Yas entirely proper. As to his own intimate 
connection with these transfers, Calvin elected to remain 
silent. The evidence he adduced to rebut the inference 
and to carry the burden of proof which was thus by law 
placed upon him amounted to little more than the calling 
of several tenants who had observed Mr. Johnson from 
time to time, and said "hello" to him. They said he ap-
peared normal. Each of the tenants confessed that if he 
had problems with his lease he went to Calvin-not to 
Arthur; that while he made the rent checks payable to 
Arthur, payment was delivered to Calvin and deposited 
by him to Arthur's account; when they wanted to renew 
their lease, they went to Calvin, and after it was dis-
cussed, Calvin took them to Arthur. Calvin was present 
when the leases were renegotiated and signed. Calvin--
not Arthur-helped with the inventory when the store 
was sold. A bishop, who called on Arthur frequently, 
was calle.d to testify that he gave Arthur a temple re-
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commend. Attorney Fenton was also called to give the 
details on the delivery of the deeds. 
The trial court was not required to accept the testi-
mony of Mr. Fenton that Mr. Johnson appeared to be 
all right as against the inferences and affirmative evi-
dence to the contrary. At the outset, ~Ir. Fenton demon-
strated that his memory was not too clear on the trans-
actions . .J[r. Fenton had testified that the will definitely 
was signed the day ~Ir. Johnson got out of the hospital, 
and at Calvin's home. (R. 505, 522) However, some 
months after the will was signed, Attorney Fenton had 
written a letter, dated the 13th day of September, 1956, 
(Ex. J) clearly stating that he had no clear recollection 
as to where the will was signed. In the body of the 
letter he stated: "This was signed b:- Art in Kanab, if 
1ny memory is correct, and at the same time oCalvin 
executed a will of his own. I presume Arthur has turned 
possession of the will to Calvin, but at the smne time 
I am not certain of this." Then in longhand at the end 
·of the letter he said: "Faun: This will may have been 
signed in 111~~ office, but I an1 certain it has been signed." 
This evidence thus discloses that ~lttorney Fenton didn't 
re1nernber too clear}~~ the details of this transaction. 
There i:::; also a letter frmn ~\ ttorney Fenton (Ex. 
15) which was written on April :2-!, 1956, to Cahin-not 
to Arthur. He told Calvin to go to ~\rthur and be sure 
that Arthur understood the nature of the transaction. 
Thi:::; letter clearly shows that as of that date ~Ir. Fenton 
was not :::;atisfied that he had given Arthur full.advice or 
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that Arthur fully understood the matter. While he thus 
urged Calvin to explain it carefully to Arthur, Calvin 
never took the witness stand, and we have no testi-
mony to the effect that Calvin did explain it to Arthur. 
There is much to indicate that he did not for only a few 
days later Arthur became seriously ill and was hospital-
ized most of the time from April 30th to May 20th, when 
he signed the deed. 
The letter of April 24th also indicates that he may 
also have been to some extent at least looking out for 
the interest of Calvin, perhaps had prepared Calvin's 
"'ill too, for he said in the later letter to Faun that Calvin 
made a will on the same day. In November, 1956, the 
bill which he sent was paid by Calvin, but from Arthur 
.Johnson's account. 
Finally, there is a natural inclination for anyone to 
defend a transaction in which he participated. In a 
transaction of this kind, the complaining parties are 
never present. The only evidence they can ever offer is 
circumstantial. They can only raise inferences suggesting 
that the act was not the free and voluntary act of the 
donor. This is clearly noted by our Supreme Court in 
Re Richards Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P. 2d 542. This 
case concerned the mental capacity of the decedent. The 
will had been witnessed by the attorney who drew the 
\:rill. He had testified in a manner calculated to support 
the will. The trial court had found against the will. In 
sustaining that decision, the Supreme Court noted that 
the trial court didn't need to accept as fact the testimony 
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of an individual who had an interest 1n the outcome, 
and said: 
"This is not limited to where the witnesses 
are actually parties or have a direct pecuniarv 
interest, but in addition, there may be the cas~, 
as here, where the ·witnesses (both connected with 
the executor, either as employees or counsel) 
have an interest by way of vindicating the pro-
priety of their conduct. Such matters are of par-
ticular importance to consider under circum-
stances where those whose rights are ·affected. 
were not present when events which later proved 
to be of critical importance transpired They are 
left to accept the testimony of those who were 
present or to discredit it by showing adverse in-
terest, inconsistency, unreasonableness or other 
weaknesses therein." 
In this case, we don't even have the testimony of aU 
the participants in the transaction, because the appell-
ants, as noted above, elected to remain mute. \V e have 
a fiduciar~- relationship, which in law placed upon ap-
pellants as recipients of the property, while Calvin held 
a fiduciary position, the burden to come forward with 
clear and convincing evidence. This burden cannot be 
1net b~- his re1naining silent, and by the observations 
of Calvin's tenants that Arthur looked all right, and 
h~- the above referred to testimony of the attorney. Had 
the trial court found that Arthur Johnson had full pos-
session of his 1nental and physical faculties, and that 
there was no fraud or undue influence, we would have 
had an entirely different problem. Even such a findin~ 
by the trial court, probably could have been overturned, 
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because contrary to the clear evidence, but we don't have 
that problem here. The trial court has found that Arthur 
Johnson was sick, did not have his mental faculties, was 
physically disabled, that he did repose special trust and 
confidence in Calvin, and that Calvin abused the con-
fidence and by fraud and undue influence, and while the 
father was out of contact with his other children, pro-
cured without adequate consideration all of his proper-
ties. Our problem is only one of determining whether the 
evidence will sustain these findings. We submit that it 
clearly does, even unaided by any inference or presump-
tion. But the evidence does not stand alone. An inference 
of culpability and guilt is drawn from the silence of ap-
pellants at the trial. They also had the burden by clear 
and convincing evidence of overcoming the presumption 
which arose out of their confidential relationship. This 
presumption is one which remains in the case and can 
be weighed and considered as evidence. See In Re Swan 
Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 P. 2d 682, where the court 
said: 
"A presumption which shifts the burden of 
persuasion does not vanish from the case upon 
a prima facie showing but remains throughout 
the case to require the fact finder to decide such 
issue of fact against the party having such burden 
unless he is convinced by the required degree of 
proof or measure of persuasion that the facts on 
that issue are contrary to such presumption. So, 
in this case, since we hold that this presumption 
shifts the burden of persuasion that there was no 
fraud or undue influence onto the proponents of 
the will, the fact finder must find that issue 
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against them unless he was convinced from the 
evidence that there was no fraud or undue in-
fluence." 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence, to-
gether with these presumptions, adequately sustain the 
trial court's findings. 
II. IN AN EQUITY CASE THE TRIAL COURT'S FIND-
INGS OF FACT SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE BY THE 
APPELLATE ·COURT, EXCEPT WHERE THEY ARE MANI-
FESTLY IN ERROR. 
As is noted above, there is only one issue of law 
raised, to-wit, were appellants entitled to a jury trial as 
to the validity of the will~ All other issues relate to 
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of 
fact. Although in an equity case, the court is to review 
both the law and the facts, the findings of fact by the 
trial court are not to be lightly set aside. The "Ctah 
Supreme Court has stated the rule many times. For 
example, in the case of First Security Bank of Utah r. 
Burgi, 122 Vtah -1-15, 251 P. 2d 297, the court said: 
"Wllile upon an appeal of a case in equity, 
this court 1nay review the findings of fact as well 
as the conclusions of law; nevertheless. the find-
ings of the trial court ''ill not be set aside unless 
it manifest!~- appears that the court has misap-
plied the proven facts, or 1nade findings clearly 
against the weight of the eYidence." 
This rule obtains for the ver~- practical reason that 
the trier of the facts had the witnesses before hln1, was 
able to observe their de1neanor, and evaluate their 
credibilit~-. It is sub1nitted that on this record, the court 
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cannot properly conclude that it "manifestly" appears 
that the trial court has misapplied proven facts or made 
findings "clearly" against the weight of the evidence. 
III. THERE IS NO DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PAR-
TIES AS TO THE SHOWING NECESSARY TO PROVE 
LACK OF CAPACITY. 
The Utah Supreme Court has on numerous occa-
sions had before it the necessity for stating the test for 
determining mental capacity to make a deed. Some of 
these cases are referred to by appellants. There ap-
parently is no dispute between the parties as to the 
law on this point. Some of the important cases in this 
regard are: Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P. 
2d 142; H.atch v. Hatch, 46 Utah 218, 148 Pac. 443; An-
derson v. Johnson, 1 Utah 2d 400, 268 P. 2d 427; In Re 
LaMonte's Estate, 95 Utah 219, 79 P. 2d 649; Blackburn 
~-. Jones, 59 Utah 558, 205 Pac. 582. See also Russworm t'. 
Mims (Okla). 164 P. 2d 238, and Sparks v. Sparks, (Cal.) 
226 Pac. 2d 238. 
We will not prolong this brief to discuss all of the 
above cases in detail. However, the facts in In Re La-
ltfonte's Estate, supra, and Anderson v. Johnson, supra, 
are strikingly similar to the facts in the instant case. In 
the LaM ante case, the grantee in the deed to certain prop-
erty ran his mother's business for her and secured a 
deed from her to the property. She was eighty years of 
age, senile and failing in memory. The court held that 
there was sufficient evidence of incompetence. 
In Anderson v. Johnson, supra, the suit was brought 
to determine the validity of certain deeds. The grantor 
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had a similar illness to that of Arthur Johnson here, and 
the grantee played an active role in making the deed and 
the will. The court held that the evidence of the grantor's 
mental incapacity was sufficient. 
In Russworm v. Mims, the Oklahoma case cited 
above, the court held that a deed executed for grossly 
inadequate consideration, by a person of great -weakness 
of mind, arising from age, sickness, or other cause, but 
not amounting to absolute disqualification, will be set 
aside by the court on proper and reasonable application 
of the injured party. 
The case of Sparks v. Sparks, the California case 
cited above, involved fraud and confidential relationship. 
The court said that gross inadequacy of consideration 
for conveyance of realty, combined "ith the grantor's 
dependence on the trust and confidence of the grantee 
is sufficient to sustain a declaration of fraud rendering 
the deed void. 
We submit that under the above authorities, the con-
clusions drawn by the trial court from the facts in tllis 
case are legally correct. 
IV. THERE WAS NO ERROR IN DENYING A JURY 
TRIAL ON THE ISSUES INVOLVING THE VALIDITY OF 
THE WILL. 
Although this point i8 the first issue raised by the 
appellants in their brief, we haYe deferred discussing 
it, because it i8 better analyzed against a complete back-
ground of the facts. A careful examination of the will 
(Ex. 1-t-) reveals that by its terms the devisees and le-
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gatees nained therein are the same persons and would 
take in the same proportions as is provided by the law 
of succession in the event of intestacy. Without regard 
to what the final outcome of this case is, appellants will 
share in the property in exactly the same way, for under 
either the will or the statutes on succession, Calvin will 
share equally with respondents. The only way in which 
the appellants could possibly be prejudiced is that under 
the will appellant Calvin was appointed executor and 
appellant Anna was appointed contingent executrix to 
act without bond. 
(a) THIS IS NOT A "WILL CONTEST." 
We contend that there was no error in the denial 
of the jury trial on this issue. The right to a jury trial 
in a will case is statutory. Our applicable Utah statutes 
would be 75-14-18 and 78-21-1, U.C.A. 1953. The Utah 
court in several cases has said that "will contest cases" 
are law cases and has indicated that they should be 
tried by a jury. See, for example, In Re George's Estate, 
100 Utah 230, 112 P. 2d 498; In Re Buttars, 123 Utah 
596, 261 P. 2d 171; In Re LaVelle's Estate, 122 Utah 253. 
While we think the comment in each of these cases was 
dicta, we will not analyze them jn detail, because we do 
not believe that this is a will contest. 
A will contest case arises only after the death of 
the decedent, where the rights of the parties have vested 
and a suit is brought to enforce legal rights. Before the 
death of the decedent, the heirs named in an existing 
will have no vested legal rights. The mere expectancy 
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of an heir is not regarded as property, and the testator 
can, without the consent of his heirs, change a will at 
any time. See Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2d Edition, 
Sec. 171. "A contest moreover cannot be initiated in ad-
vance of offer to probate of the will which is sought to 
be contested." Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2d Edition, 
Sec. 162. 
At the time of the trial here, Arthur Johnson was 
still living, but was incompetent. It was not necessary 
under the law to await his death, so that the parties 
could offer the will for probate and have a will contest. 
It was entirely proper for the guardians of Arthur 
Johnson to bring a suit in equity to have the will de-
clared void during Arthur Johnson's lifetime. Such a 
suit is not a will contest, but is an action to set aside 
an instrument. The grounds are mental incapacity and 
fraud. This raises only equitable issues; it does not in-
volve legal rights. No rights are vested under a will 
until the testator's death. In '-iew of Cah·-in's conduct, 
the guardians would have been derelict in their duty had 
they not sought on Arthur's behalf to '"'ithdraw or cancel 
the appointment of Calvin as executor. 
Appellants confess that an action to set aside a 
deed on the grounds of fraud or Inental incapacity is 
an equity case, triable without a jury. They also concede 
that an action to rescind the contract, or to set it aside 
on the same grounds is equitable and not triable to a 
jnry. (See appellants' brief page 19) Such a confession 
by appellants is, of course, in cmnplete harn1ony with the 
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existing law. \Vhy should there be any other or different 
rule of law if the instrument being attacked is a will 
instead of a deed or a contract~ Actions to set aside 
instnunents executed by people without mental capacity 
or to rescind because of fraud have always been con-
sidered equitable actions, triable by the court \vithout a 
jury. 
The Inatter is treated in the West Digest Systmn 
under the title "Juries," Sec. 14(6) Recent cases apply-
ing the rule are Summers v. M artim, 77 Idaho 469, 295 
P. 2d 265, (an action to rescind a contract and for money 
damages); Ward v. Lindly, (Okla.) 294 P. 2d 296, (an 
action to cancel a deed because of grantor's incapacity 
and for possession); Goodson v. Smith (Wyo.) 243 P. 
2d 163, (an action to cancel a contract on grounds of 
fraud). 
We submit that a suit of this type brought during 
the testator's lifetime before the rights of any of the 
parties have vested as legal rights is identical to a suit 
to vacate a deed or a contract. 
(b) IF THE WILL ISSUES ARE HELD TO BE LEGAL, 
THEY, NEVERTHELESS, WERE ENTWINED WITH 
EQUITABLE ISSUES, AND THE TRIAL COURT 
PROPERLY COULD TRY BOTH WITHOUT A JURY. 
If it were to be conceded that a suit brought to va-
cate a will during the testator's lifetime were a will con-
test, where Calvin had legal rights which had attached 
and which he could enforce against Arthur Johnson, even 
then appellants were not entitled to a jury trial. In a 
suit where issues raised are both legal and equitable, 
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the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the incidental 
legal points can be tried by the court without a jury 
if the major issues are equitable in nature, and the 
problems are entwined. Appellants confess in their brief 
that the major issues here were equitable. In determining 
the validity of the will and validity of the deeds, the 
evidence to be adduced was absolutely identical. It was 
not possible, without a multiplicity of suits, to separ-
ately try the issue on the will and the issue on the 
deeds and contract of sale. From this identical evidence, 
it was for the court to determine mental capacity to 
make the deeds, and the contract, and to determine 
·whether there was fraud and undue influence. This ap-
pellants concede. But they then wanted a jury to sit and 
review the identical evidence to determine whether the 
jury thought the capacity existed to make the will, and 
"'Whether it was free from fraud and undue influence. Thi'3 
has been often considered by the r tah Supren1e Court. 
In Norback 1./. Board of Directors of Churclz Extension 
Society, 84 Utah 506, 37 P. 2d 339, the court said: 
"If the issues are legal. or the Inajor issue 
legal, either party is entitled upon proper de-
rnand to a jury trial ; but if the issues are 
equitable or the 1najor issues to be resolved by 
an application of equity. the legal issues being 
1nerely subsidiary, the action should be regarded 
as equitable, and the rules of equity apply." 
The holding of this case was Inodified to some ex-
tent h~· the court in Fallcy JJJortuar.ll v. Fairbanks, 119 
Utah 204, :2:2:> P. 2d 739. There the court, in regard to 
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cases where the legal and equitable issues are inter-
twined stated in a comment on the Nor back case that : 
"Appraised in the light of the California 
rule, the Nor back case is apparently correct in 
result, but the rule there laid down as to when 
litigants are entitled to a trial by jury, which 
we have quoted above, cannot be reconciled with 
the California rule which we have approved and 
adopted in this opinion." 
But then the court went on to say: 
"There may be certain types of cases, al-
though none occur to us now, in which the issues 
of fact in the legal cause of .act~on are so inter-
twined with the issues of fact in the equitable 
cause of action that they cannot be separated for 
the purpose of trial by jury. Only then would it 
seem that the court should determine whether 
the major issue or issues are legal or equitable 
and grant or deny a jury trial accordingly." 
It is submitted that if both legal and equitable issues 
of fact are present in this case (which we deny) the 
major issues certainly are equitable. These equitable 
issues are so intertwined factwise, with the problems on 
the validity of the will, that they could not be separated 
for the purposes of the trial. Under the above quoted 
rule, the court's decision denying the jury trial should be 
upheld. 
(c) EVEN IF APPELLANTS WERE ENTITLED TO A 
JURY, THE ERROR WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRE-
JUDICIAL. 
Finally, we contend that the denial of the right of 
jury trial is, in any event, not prejudicial. We have al-
ready noted that the will does not change the distribution 
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of the property from that provided by the statutes 
governing succession. We are litigating here only the 
right of Calvin and Anna Johnson to serve as execu-
tors. The Utah statute, Section 75-3-15, U.C.A. 1953, 
expressly provides : 
"No person is competent to serve as an execu-
tor who at the time the will is admitted to pro-
bate is either adjudged by the court incompetent 
to execute the duties of the trust by reason of 
* * * want of integrity." 
If the findings of the trial court in this case con-
cerning the major issue are sustainable under the evi-
dence, Calvin would never be permitted to act as executor 
of this estate-his conflicts with it are too great, and 
the adjudication that he defrauded his father of all of 
his properties would disqualify him to act. Arthur 
Johnson has now died and the question as to who will 
act as executor will soon exist. If the findings concerning 
the primary issues (the deeds and the contract) are 
reversed, and Calvin is held to OW'll the property abso-
lutely, there isn't any estate to probate. But if the 
holding of the trial court stands, and all this valuable 
property comes back into the estate. it 1nust be pro-
bated. Either under the will or under the statute, it ·will 
go equally to the parties to this suit. In such an eYent 
because of the ilnputations of fraud, Cah'in has been 
adjudged to lack basic integrit~~. He '''"ould not be per-
mitted to execute the duties of the trust ilnposed by law 
on the executor of an estate. Further, we belieYe that 
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49 
the evidence in this case, aided by the presumptions re-
feiTed to above, so strongly establishes the want of 
mental capacity and the existence of fraud and undue 
influence, that a directed verdict \vould have been re-
quired. 
It is, therefore, submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
V. PERSHING NELSON 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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